He's wrong. (He claims Carl Heneghan supports his idea of what false positive means, which I find very hard to believe. I suspect a misunderstanding, and I think More or Less conclude the same.)
(Lots of Heneghan's critiques seem perfectly reasonable to me: PCR isn't really a yes/no test so knowing the iteration number would surely be useful; it seems plausible that some positive tests are showing people who aren't infectious, and maybe we shouldn't worry about them if we could measure that. I'd like it if he took seriously the possibility that this infection might have an unusual rate and severity of long-term complications; I think whenever he's talked about that he's dismissed it by saying that other viruses can also (rarely) cause long-term complications.)
Suppose there's some condition (or other property) of a person, X (which most people don't have), and a test for it which just returns positive or negative.
There are two relevant errors for this test
- if I get a positive test, what's the chance that I don't in fact have X?
- if I have X, what's the chance that the test returns a negative result?
To estimate the first one you obviously take some people who've tested positive and check how many of them in reality don't have X. To estimate the second one you need to find some people who have X, test them, and see how many test negative. Neither involves the total number of people you tested.
(For our coronavirus tests we don't have a great idea of what the two error rates are.)